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vigorously denies in testimony that she agreed to $530 per week
as support in connection with the April 1 letter, the April 1
letter is ambiguous regarding the terms of support, and Harvey
routinely disregarded his purported obligation to pay this
amount; all of which suggests that petitioners had not reached an
oral agreement regarding support prior to or by means of the
April 1 letter.
Finally, Harvey argues that the “Matrimonial Support”
paragraph of the April 1 letter was incorporated by reference in
the first of the June 1 letters. This June 1 letter begins:
With reference to your telephone conversation with my
offices yesterday, our prior communications and phone
conversations and with specific reference to the Lease
from SILVER LAKE ASSOCIATES (Owner) to our Clients
(Tenants), it is understood and agreed as follows
* * *.
Harvey contends that the reference to “our prior communications”
incorporated the terms of the April 1 letter. We reject this
contention. The reference is too vague to support such a
construction, particularly in the context of the specificity with
which the June 1 letters address their intended subject of living
arrangements.
While the April 1 letter does not constitute or form part of
a written separation agreement within the meaning of section
71(b)(2)(B), the June 1 letters are another matter. These
letters, written and signed by Hermine’s attorney and
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