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standard. See Jacklin v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 340, 351 (1982)
(agreement to provide “funds * * * necessary to sustain a
standard of living equivalent to that which obtained before the
separation” not insufficient as matter of law). Based on the
foregoing authority, we believe petitioners’ agreement in the
June 1 letters that Harvey would “pay all normal and usual
expenses of maintenance and operation” of the two identified
residences qualifies as a written separation agreement with
ascertainable standards. That petitioners did not execute a
written agreement covering all elements of Hermine’s support does
not negate the fact that they had a written agreement covering a
part. Accordingly, cash payments received by (or on behalf of)
Hermine within the terms of the June 1 letters were payments made
“under” a divorce or separation instrument as required by section
71(b)(1)(A).
Applying this conclusion to the payments that were
stipulated as made by Harvey either directly to or on behalf of
Hermine, we find that some of the payments clearly fall outside
the terms of the June 1 letters, which constitute the only
section 71(b)(2)(B) written separation agreement established by
the evidence. Specifically, the payments of $26,358.65 in 1990
and $25,012.55 in 1991 stipulated as having been made directly to
Hermine by Harvey have not been shown to come within the terms of
“normal and usual expenses of maintenance and operation” of the
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