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countersigned by Harvey’s attorney7 as “UNDERSTOOD, ACCEPTED AND
AGREED”, outline specific and detailed terms under which Harvey
agreed to “pay all normal and usual expenses of maintenance and
operation of the marital home and the alternate residence [i.e.,
the apartment]”, and Harvey and Hermine agreed to alternating 2-
month occupancy of both premises.
Hermine argues that the June 1 letters are not a written
separation agreement because they constitute “only an agreement
as to providing a place to live” for her. Respondent appears to
agree; while conceding that the June 1 letters constitute a
“meeting of the minds”, he nevertheless contends that there was
no meeting of the minds “on the issue of alimony or separate
maintenance”. We disagree. To the extent respondent suggests
that an agreement to pay Hermine’s rent or mortgage is not an
agreement to pay alimony, he contradicts his own regulations.
See sec. 1.71-1T(b), Q&A-6, Temporary Income Tax Regs., 49 Fed.
Reg. 34455 (Aug. 31, 1984) (“cash payments of rent, mortgage,
tax, or tuition liabilities of the payee spouse made under the
terms of * * * [a] divorce or separation instrument will qualify
as alimony or separate maintenance payments”). Hermine points to
no authority for the proposition that a written separation
agreement must be more comprehensive than providing for shelter,
7 None of the parties dispute that each petitioner’s
attorney had authorization to execute the letters on that
petitioner’s behalf.
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