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Grant v. Commissioner, 84 T.C. 809, 822-823 (1985), affd. without
published opinion 800 F.2d 260 (4th Cir. 1986); Estate of Hill v.
Commissioner, 59 T.C. 846, 856-857 (1973); Ewell v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 1996-253; Mercurio v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1995-
312; Harlow v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1984-393; Greenfield v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1978-386. However, where one spouse
assents in writing to a letter proposal of support by the other
spouse, a valid written separation agreement has been held to
exist. See Azenaro v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1989-224.
Furthermore, a written separation agreement will not fail simply
because it does not enumerate a specific amount of required
support, so long as there is some ascertainable standard with
which to calculate support amounts. See Jacklin v. Commissioner,
supra at 348-351.
Harvey takes the position that the April 1 and June 1
letters together constitute a written separation agreement within
the meaning of section 71(b)(2)(B) under which he paid all
amounts stipulated as paid directly to or on Hermine’s behalf.
We do not believe the April 1 letter constitutes a written
separation agreement. Its language is vague (e.g., “Mrs.
Leventhal has available to her $450 per week”) and when fairly
read constitutes at best a set of unilateral proposals or offers.
The letter is clearly marked “WITHOUT PREJUDICE”, and some items
are expressly contingent on Hermine’s agreement to take other
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