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of the $14,673 lump-sum payment by petitioner in January 1994
pursuant to the contempt order was made for the benefit of Betty
under subparagraph (A) of section 71(b)(1). The payments for her
benefit include the attorney’s fees, most of the miscellaneous
expenses and one-half the first mortgage, home insurance and real
estate taxes paid.3
In holding that only some of the payments at issue were made
on behalf of Betty, we reject petitioner’s contention that he
paid all these amounts to Betty or on her behalf. Petitioner
contends that all the payments come within the broad statutory
definition of "maintenance" under Minnesota law.
"Maintenance" means an award made in a dissolution or
legal separation proceeding of payments from the future
income or earnings of one spouse for the support and
maintenance of the other. [Minn. Stat. sec. 518.54,
subd. 3 (West 1990 & Supp. 1999-2000).]
Petitioner places too much emphasis on the definition of the
word "maintenance" in the Minnesota statute. "Although the
property interests of divorcing parties are determined by state
law, federal law governs the federal income tax treatment of that
property." Hoover v. Commissioner, 102 F.3d 842, 845 (6th Cir.
3Under our holding, some of the lump-sum payments–-
specifically those amounts representing one-half the payments on
the first mortgage, real estate taxes and insurance, plus all the
payments on the second mortgage–-were for petitioner’s benefit.
The fact that these latter amounts were "received by" Betty does
not convert them into alimony under sec. 71(b)(1)(A). In effect,
Betty had only advanced those sums, which petitioner ultimately
paid by reimbursing her.
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