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mortgage. Petitioner argues that, pursuant to the divorce
decree, his payments on the second mortgage note were made on a
house he no longer owned. Thus, he concludes, his payments on
the second mortgage were made on Betty’s behalf. Petitioner’s
argument ignores his failure to establish that Betty would
benefit economically from his payments on the second mortgage.
See Taylor v. Commissioner, supra. Accordingly, those payments
would not be made on behalf of Betty and would not meet the
definition of alimony in section 71(b)(1).
We recognize that, if petitioner had not made the second
mortgage payments, the resulting foreclosure might have
interfered with Betty’s rent-free use of the house. This
possibility, however, does not transform petitioner’s
nondeductible payment on his personal debt into deductible
alimony. See Bradley v. Commissioner, 30 T.C. 701, 707 (1958);
cf. sec. 1.71-1T(b), Q&A-6, Temporary Income Tax Regs., 49 Fed.
Reg. 34455 (Aug. 31, 1984).
As we have held, some of the payments in issue--the
attorney’s fees, most of the miscellaneous expenses and one-half
the first mortgage, home insurance and real estate taxes–-were
payments on behalf of Betty and thus satisfy the requirements of
section 71(b)(1)(A).
As to these particular payments, however, respondent
contends that they fail to qualify as alimony on the additional
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