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ground that they do not satisfy the requirement that "there is no
liability to make any such payment for any period after the death
of the payee spouse". Sec. 71(b)(1)(D). Accordingly, respondent
concludes, these payments are not alimony. We agree with
respondent insofar as the attorney’s fees are concerned;
otherwise, we disagree.
In the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Congress imposed the
requirement that alimony payments must relate solely to periods
before the death of the payee. See section 71(b)(1)(D), as
amended by the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-369,
sec. 422(a), 98 Stat. 795. Under that Act, the provision that
alimony payments terminate with the payee’s death was required to
be set forth in the divorce or separation agreement. In 1986,
however, Congress removed the requirement that the termination-
at-death provision be specifically set forth in the divorce or
separation agreement. See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-
514, sec. 1843(b), 100 Stat. 2853. Thus, payments now qualify as
long as termination would occur automatically under State law.
In section 71(b)(1)(D), Congress recognized that payments
would operate to support and maintain the payee only if they
related to periods before her death, and that payments for
periods after her death obviously would not provide such support.
The relevant legislative history explains:
In order to prevent the deduction of amounts which
are in effect transfers of property unrelated to the
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