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made on behalf of Betty–-specifically the attorney’s fees,
miscellaneous expenses, mortgage payments, home insurance, and
real estate taxes–-lacked that label. Respondent accordingly
urges that neither the pertinent State statutes nor the State
court’s orders provide that the payments in dispute would
terminate on the death of the payee spouse. Thus, respondent
concludes, these specific payments do not meet the requirement
imposed by section 71(b)(1)(D).
Respondent has placed too much emphasis on the State court’s
failure to describe the payments as "maintenance". Respondent’s
argument overlooks consideration that, whatever they are called,
these payments (with the exception of the attorney’s fees) will
end with the death of the payee spouse. They thus satisfy the
requirement to be treated as alimony contained in section
71(b)(1)(D).
We recognize that, if Betty had died while the temporary
order was in effect, petitioner might have remained contractually
liable for some of the payments, such as those on the mortgage.
Such an event, however, would have transformed the portion of the
payments made "on behalf of" Betty into nondeductible personal
expenses of petitioner alone, pursuant to section 262. Thus,
their status as alimony payments under section 71(b)(1) would
have terminated with Betty’s death. See Israel v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 1995-500; cf. Cologne v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
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