- 16 -
1996)(citing Green v. Commissioner, 855 F.2d 289, 292 (6th Cir.
1988)), affg. T.C. Memo. 1995-183. Accordingly, a State
statute’s definition of certain items as "maintenance" or
"alimony" does not control the Federal taxation of those items
when those items fail to satisfy the definition of alimony
contained in section 71(b)(1). See Hoover v. Commissioner,
supra; Baker v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2000-164. Here, as we
have held, Federal law determines, for income tax purposes, the
amount of the payments that were paid on Betty’s behalf and thus
constitute alimony within the meaning of section 71(b)(1).
We also reaffirm our ruling at trial in which we rejected,
as irrelevant, evidence of the parties’ intent as to the nature
of the payments at issue. The statutory definition of alimony in
section 71(b)(1) does not include a consideration of the parties’
intent. The omission is deliberate. As the Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit has noted, in amending section 71(b), Congress
sought to eliminate "subjective inquiries into intent and the
nature of payments that had plagued the courts in favor of a
simpler, more objective test". Hoover v. Commissioner, supra.4
Nor can we accept petitioner’s arguments specifically
addressed to the "alimony" status of his payments on the second
4In this regard, petitioner’s reliance upon cases such as
Wells v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1998-2, is misplaced. The
documents in this case do not present the type of inconsistencies
or ambiguities that permitted the introduction of extrinsic
evidence as to intent in Wells.
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