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purpose of providing the earned income credit to the most
appropriate individuals. See, e.g., Fein v. United States, 730 F.2d
1211, 1212 (8th Cir. 1984) (retroactive taxes are rational because
taxpayers otherwise could “order their affairs freely to avoid the
effect of the change”).
Petitioner contends that should we apply the 1998 amendment to
deny her entitlement to the earned income credit (which we do),
harsh and oppressive results would ensue to her. We disagree. The
earned income credit is a governmental subsidy aimed at providing
assistance to low-income taxpayers. Congress’ clarification of the
eligibility requirements to continue to provide the credit to the
most appropriate recipients is not the “harsh and oppressive” result
that would require us to strike down the amendment as
unconstitutional. Thus, petitioner has failed to convince us that
the denial of the earned income credit in this case is “so harsh and
oppressive” as to necessitate a finding that the retroactive
application of the 1998 amendment violates the due process clause of
the Constitution.
In determining whether a retroactive amendment is
constitutional, we must further consider the length of the period
affected by the amendment. See United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S.
at 32-33; Canisius College v. United States, 799 F.2d 18, 26 (2d
Cir. 1986). Congress frequently enacts tax legislation with an
effective date prior to the actual date of the enactment. See
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