- 17 -
months); United States v. Hudson, 299 U.S. 498 (1937) (upholding 1-
month retroactive application); Quarty v. United States, 170 F.3d
961 (9th Cir. 1999) (upholding 8-month retroactive application);
Kitt v. United States, ___ Fed. Cl. ___ (Oct. 6, 2000) (upholding 1-
year retroactive application); NationsBank v. United States, 44 Fed.
Cl. 661, 666 (1999) (upholding 5-month retroactive application). In
other instances, even a period of several years has passed muster.
See, e.g., Licari v. Commissioner, 946 F.2d 690 (9th Cir. 1991)
(upholding application of tax penalty passed in 1986 to returns
filed between 1982 and 1984), affg. T.C. Memo. 1990-4; Canisius
College v. United States, supra (upholding 4-year retroactive
application); Temple University v. United States, supra at 134-135
(upholding 4-year retroactive application); Rocanova v. United
States, 955 F. Supp. 27 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (upholding retroactive
application of amendment extending statute of limitations on tax
collection actions from 6 to 10 years), affd. per curiam 109 F.3d
127 (2d Cir. 1997).
Clearly, some retroactivity is necessary as a practical matter.
Petitioner disputes the application of this amendment to her 1997
tax year, approximately a 1-year period. The 1-year period of
retroactivity as applicable to petitioner is reasonable, is within
precedential limits, and lends support to the constitutionality of
the 1998 amendment.
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