- 16 -
United States v. Darusmont, 449 U.S. at 296. “This ‘customary
congressional practice’ generally has been ‘confined to short and
limited periods required by the practicalities of producing national
legislation.’” United States v. Carlton, supra at 32-33 (quoting
United States v. Darusmont, supra at 296-297). The retroactive
period generally must be “modest” and not excessive. See United
States v. Carlton, supra; see also United States v. Hemme, 476 U.S.
558, 562 (1986). Nevertheless, neither the Supreme Court nor the
Courts of Appeals have applied “an absolute temporal limitation” on
the periods affected by retroactive legislation for the legislation
to withstand a constitutional challenge. See Temple University v.
United States, 769 F.2d at 135. “There is nothing intrinsic in the
‘harsh and oppressive’ test * * * that requires a one-year bench
mark as the constitutional limit of retroactivity.” Canisius
College v. United States, supra at 26; see also Wiggins v.
Commissioner, 904 F.2d at 316. Instead, we review tax legislation
case by case, considering “‘the nature of the tax and the
circumstances in which it is laid’”. Canisius College v. United
States, supra at 27 (quoting Welch v. Henry, 305 U.S. at 147).
Generally, in those cases where retroactive application was
allowed, courts have found the period of retroactivity to be modest.
See, e.g., United States v. Carlton, supra (upholding 14-month
retroactive application); United States v. Darusmont, supra
(upholding retroactive application within calendar year of 10
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