- 16 - United States v. Darusmont, 449 U.S. at 296. “This ‘customary congressional practice’ generally has been ‘confined to short and limited periods required by the practicalities of producing national legislation.’” United States v. Carlton, supra at 32-33 (quoting United States v. Darusmont, supra at 296-297). The retroactive period generally must be “modest” and not excessive. See United States v. Carlton, supra; see also United States v. Hemme, 476 U.S. 558, 562 (1986). Nevertheless, neither the Supreme Court nor the Courts of Appeals have applied “an absolute temporal limitation” on the periods affected by retroactive legislation for the legislation to withstand a constitutional challenge. See Temple University v. United States, 769 F.2d at 135. “There is nothing intrinsic in the ‘harsh and oppressive’ test * * * that requires a one-year bench mark as the constitutional limit of retroactivity.” Canisius College v. United States, supra at 26; see also Wiggins v. Commissioner, 904 F.2d at 316. Instead, we review tax legislation case by case, considering “‘the nature of the tax and the circumstances in which it is laid’”. Canisius College v. United States, supra at 27 (quoting Welch v. Henry, 305 U.S. at 147). Generally, in those cases where retroactive application was allowed, courts have found the period of retroactivity to be modest. See, e.g., United States v. Carlton, supra (upholding 14-month retroactive application); United States v. Darusmont, supra (upholding retroactive application within calendar year of 10Page: Previous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 Next
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