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concerned. See, e.g., Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337,
340 (1997). That threshold determination must be made with
reference to the context in which such language appears. Id.
B. Language of Section 382(l)(3)(A)(i)
Section 382(l)(3)(A)(i) provides as follows:
(A) Constructive ownership.–-Section 318 (relating
to constructive ownership of stock) shall apply in
determining ownership of stock, except that–-
(i) paragraphs (1) and (5)(B) of section
318(a) shall not apply and an individual and all
members of his family described in paragraph (1)
of section 318(a) shall be treated as 1 individual
for purposes of applying this section * * *
Respondent apparently would limit our textual analysis to a
single word. According to respondent, Charles and Kenneth are
not common members of any individual’s family under section
382(l)(3)(A)(i) “[b]ecause the commonly used meaning of the term
‘individual’ does not include a deceased parent”. We believe
respondent’s focus is too narrow. As stated by the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit:
However, even apparently plain words, divorced from the
context in which they arise and in which their creators
intended them to function, may not accurately convey
the meaning the creators intended to impart. It is
only, therefore, within a context that a word, any
word, can communicate an idea.
Leach v. FDIC, 860 F.2d 1266, 1270 (5th Cir. 1988). In our view,
the question is not whether the noun “individual”, standing
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