- 20 -
conference committee’s excision of the House bill’s family status
provision makes perfect sense.19
3. Revisiting the Language of the Statute
That our interpretation of section 382(l)(3)(A)(i) provides
a cogent explanation for the conference committee’s action is of
no consequence if a plain reading of the statute does not permit
that interpretation. See supra part III.A. The use of the term
“individual” in section 382(l)(3)(A)(i), however, does not
preclude a contextual interpretation pursuant to which the set of
individuals contemplated by Congress (i.e., individuals who own
shares of the loss corporation) is smaller than the universe of
all possible individuals (i.e., all living beings). More
importantly, we are satisfied that our interpretation proceeds
from an entirely natural reading of the statute. Given a stock
ownership rule that operates by reference to an individual and
other persons who are defined in terms of their relationship to
19 We recognize that, even if the family aggregation rule
were not limited to shareholders, the “tiebreaker” rule of sec.
1.382-2T(h)(6)(iv), Temporary Income Tax Regs., 52 Fed. Reg.
29686, would preclude the artificial ownership increase
illustrated above by treating the shareholder spouse as a member
of his own family rather than that of the nonshareholder spouse.
See supra part I.C. Of course, that regulation was not in
existence when the conference committee acted on H.R. 3838.
Accordingly, it is not relevant to our analysis of such committee
action. Regarding the remedial effect of the regulation under
our interpretation of the family aggregation rule, see infra part
III.E.5.
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