- 23 -
family aggregation rule to apply from the perspective of
individuals who are shareholders of the loss corporation.20
5. Revisiting the Regulations
Having concluded that our interpretation of the family
aggregation rule (1) does not violate the plain meaning rule, and
(2) arguably finds support in the legislative history of section
382(l)(3)(A)(i), we would nonetheless be hard pressed to adopt
that interpretation if it were inconsistent with respondent’s 17-
year-old “legislative” regulations. See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A.,
Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-844
(1984); see also sec. 382(m) (directing the Secretary to
“prescribe such regulations as may be necessary or appropriate to
carry out the purposes of this section”). As is the case with
the statute, see supra part III.E.3., the language of the
relevant regulation presents no such obstacle. See sec. 1.382-
2T(h)(6), Temporary Income Tax Regs, supra at 29686.
Nor does our interpretation of the statute render
superfluous the “tiebreaker” rule of paragraph (h)(6)(iv) of the
above-cited regulation. See supra note 19. To the contrary,
that rule serves the useful purpose of precluding purely
“vicarious” ownership increases that could otherwise occur under
20 We do not mean to suggest that sec. 382(l)(3)(A)(i)
should be interpreted as incorporating a modified version of sec.
318(a)(1) (i.e., one that substitutes grandparents for
grandchildren); such an interpretation presumably would violate
the plain meaning rule. See supra part III.A.
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