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alone, typically denotes a living person–-typically it does.7
The question, rather, is whether the language of section
382(l)(3)(A)(i) as a whole definitively establishes, one way or
the other, that the identification of a (living) individual whose
family members are aggregated thereunder must be made, as
respondent maintains (or need not be made, as petitioner
maintains), coincident with the determination of stock ownership
under section 382 (i.e., on a testing date or at any point during
a testing period).8 Stated negatively, is the language of
section 382(l)(3)(A)(i) so plain as to preclude either party’s
position, as so identified?
We are satisfied that the language of section
382(l)(3)(A)(i) can variably (and reasonably) be interpreted as
being consistent with each party’s position in this case. That
is, there is nothing in the language of the statute that would
make either party’s position patently untenable. While a rule
attributing stock owned by an individual on a measurement date to
members of his family presupposes that the individual is alive,
7 Cf. Jonson v. Commissioner, 353 F.3d 1181, 1184 (10th
Cir. 2003)(decedent’s estate is not an “individual” eligible for
innocent spouse relief under sec. 6015(c)), affg. 118 T.C. 106
(2002).
8 Putting the question somewhat differently, at the time
stock ownership is to be determined, must the individual
referenced in sec. 382(l)(3)(A)(i) be available (alive) for a
family portrait, or need he or she only occupy a place in the
family tree?
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