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Syllabus
Indeed, as already found, Title I is closely drawn to match Congress' important interest in preventing the corruption or the appearance of corruption of federal candidates and officeholders. That interest is sufficient to ground Congress' exercise of its Elections Clause power. Pp. 186-187. 3. Also rejected is the argument that BCRA Title I violates equal protection by discriminating against political parties in favor of special interest groups, which remain free to raise soft money to fund voter registration, GOTV activities, mailings, and broadcast advertising (other than electioneering communications). First, BCRA actually favors political parties in many ways, e. g., by allowing party committees to receive individual contributions substantially exceeding FECA limits on contributions to nonparty political committees. More importantly, Congress is fully entitled to consider the salient, real-world differences between parties and interest groups when crafting a campaign finance regulation system, see National Right to Work, supra, at 210, including the fact that parties have influence and power in the legislature vastly exceeding any interest group's. Taken seriously, plaintiffs' equal protection arguments would call into question not just BCRA Title I, but much of FECA's pre-existing structure. Pp. 187-188. 4. Accordingly, the judgment below is affirmed insofar as it upheld §§ 323(e) and 323(f) and reversed insofar as it invalidated §§ 323(a), 323(b), and 323(d). Pp. 188-189. 5. The District Court's judgment is affirmed to the extent that it upheld the disclosure requirements in amended FECA § 304 and rejected the facial attack on the provisions relating to donors of $1,000 or more, but reversed to the extent that it invalidated FECA § 304(f)(5). Pp. 189-202. (a) BCRA § 201 comprehensively amends FECA § 304, which requires political committees to file detailed periodic financial reports with the FEC. The narrowing construction adopted in Buckley limited FECA's disclosure requirement to communications expressly advocating the election or defeat of particular candidates. BCRA adopts a new term, "electioneering communication," which encompasses any "broadcast, cable, or satellite communication" that clearly identifies a candidate for federal office, airs within a specific time period (e. g., within 60 days of a general election and 30 days of a primary), and is targeted to the relevant electorate. 2 U. S. C. § 434(f)(3)(A)(i). BCRA also amends § 304 to provide disclosure requirements for persons who fund electioneering communications (and BCRA § 203 amends FECA § 316(b)(2) to extend those requirements to corporations and labor unions).
Plaintiffs challenge the new term's constitutionality as it applies to both disclosures and expenditures, arguing primarily that Buckley drew
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