Cite as: 540 U. S. 93 (2003)
Syllabus
The Chief Justice delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to miscellaneous BCRA Title III and IV provisions, concluding that the District Court's judgment with respect to these provisions must be affirmed. Pp. 224-233. 1. The plaintiffs' challenges to BCRA § 305, § 307, and the millionaire provisions are nonjusticiable. Pp. 224-230. (a) The McConnell plaintiffs lack standing to challenge BCRA § 305, which amends the federal Communications Act of 1934 requirement that, 45 days before a primary or 60 days before a general election, broadcast stations sell air time to a qualified candidate at their "lowest unit charge," 47 U. S. C. § 315(b). Section 305's amendment, in turn, denies a candidate the benefit of that charge in specified circumstances. 47 U. S. C. §§ 315(b)(2)(A), (C). Senator McConnell's testimony that he plans to run ads critical of his opponents and had run them in the past is too remote temporally to satisfy the Article III standing requirement that a plaintiff demonstrate an "injury in fact" that is "actual or imminent," Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U. S. 149, 155, 158, given that the lowest unit charge requirement is not available until 45 days before a primary, that Senator McConnell's current term does not expire until 2009, and that, therefore, the earliest day he could be affected by § 305 is 45 days before the 2008 Republican primary election. Pp. 224-226. (b) The Adams and Paul plaintiffs lack standing to challenge BCRA § 307, which amends FECA § 315(a)(1) to increase and index for inflation certain contribution limits. Neither injury alleged by the Adams plaintiffs, a group of voters, voter organizations, and candidates, is sufficient to confer standing. First, their assertion that § 307 deprives them of an equal ability to participate in the election process based on their economic status does not satisfy the standing requirement that a plaintiff's alleged injury be an invasion of a concrete and particularized legally protected interest, Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 560, since political "free trade" does not necessarily require that all who participate in the political marketplace do so with exactly equal resources, e. g., Federal Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U. S. 238, 257 (MCFL). Second, the Adams plaintiffs-candidates' contention that § 307 puts them at a "fundraising disadvantage" compared to their opponents because they do not wish to solicit or accept the large campaign contributions BCRA permits does not meet the standing requirement that their alleged injury be "fairly traceable" to § 307, see Lujan, supra, at 562, since their alleged inability to compete stems not from § 307's operation, but from their own personal choice not to solicit or accept large contributions. Also inadequate for standing purposes is the Paul plaintiffs' contention that their congressional campaigns and public interest advocacy involve traditional press
107
Page: Index Previous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 NextLast modified: October 4, 2007