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activities, such that § 307's contribution limits, together with FECA § 315's individual and political action committee contribution limitations, impose unconstitutional editorial control on them in violation of the First Amendment's Freedom of the Press Clause. These plaintiffs cannot show the requisite substantial likelihood their requested relief will remedy their alleged injury in fact, see Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U. S. 765, 771, since, even if the Court were to strike down BCRA § 307's increases and indexes, as they ask, both FECA's contribution limits and an exemption for institutional news media would remain unchanged. Pp. 226-229. (c) The Adams plaintiffs lack standing to challenge the so-called "millionaire provisions," BCRA §§ 304, 316, and 319, which provide for a series of staggered increases in otherwise applicable contribution-to-candidate limits if the candidate's opponent spends a triggering amount of his personal funds, and eliminate the coordinated expenditure limits in certain circumstances. Because these plaintiffs allege the same injuries that they alleged with regard to BCRA § 307, they fail to state a cognizable injury that is fairly traceable to BCRA. Additionally, none of them is a candidate in an election affected by the millionaire provisions, and it would be purely conjectural to assume that any of them ever will be. Pp. 229-230. 2. The District Court's decision upholding BCRA § 311's expansion of FECA § 318(a) to include mandatory electioneering-communications-disbursements disclosure is affirmed because such inclusion bears a sufficient relationship to the important governmental interest of "shed-[ding] the light of publicity" on campaign financing, Buckley, 424 U. S., at 81. Assuming, as the Court must, that FECA § 318 is valid both to begin with and as amended by BCRA § 311's amendments other than the electioneering-communications inclusion, the latter inclusion is not itself unconstitutional. Pp. 230-231. 3. BCRA § 318—which forbids individuals "17 years old or younger" to make contributions to candidates and political parties, 2 U. S. C. § 441k—violates the First Amendment rights of minors, see, e. g., Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U. S. 503, 511- 513. Because limitations on an individual's political contributions impinge on the freedoms of expression and association, see Buckley, supra, at 20-22, the Court applies heightened scrutiny to such a limitation, asking whether it is justified by a "sufficiently important interest" and "closely drawn" to avoid unnecessary abridgment of the First Amendment, see, e. g., post, at 136 (joint opinion of Stevens and O'Connor, JJ.). The Government offers scant evidence for its assertion that § 318 protects against corruption by conduit—i. e., donations by parents through their minor children to circumvent contribution limits applica-
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