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MCFL-type entities, and the Government concedes that it does not. As so construed, the provision is plainly valid. Pp. 209-211. 9. Because this Court has already found BCRA § 201's executory contract disclosure requirement constitutional, plaintiffs' challenge to a similar disclosure requirement in BCRA § 212, which added FECA § 304(g), 2 U. S. C. § 434, is essentially moot. Pp. 211-212. 10. The District Court's judgment is affirmed to the extent that it invalidated BCRA § 213, which amends FECA § 315(d)(4) to require political parties to choose between coordinated and independent expenditures during the postnomination, preelection period. 2 U. S. C. § 441a(d)(4). That provision places an unconstitutional burden on the parties' right to make unlimited independent expenditures. Although the category of burdened speech is limited to independent expenditures for express advocacy—and therefore is relatively small—it plainly is entitled to First Amendment protection. The governmental interest in requiring parties to avoid using magic words is not sufficient to support the burden imposed by § 315(d)(4). The fact that the provision is cast as a choice rather than an outright prohibition on independent expenditures does not make it constitutional. Pp. 213-219. 11. The District Court's judgment is affirmed to the extent that it rejected plaintiffs' challenges to BCRA § 214, which adds FECA § 315(a)(7)(B)(ii), 2 U. S. C. § 441a(a)(7)(B)(ii). FECA § 315(a)(7)(B)(i) long has provided that expenditures that are controlled by or coordinated with a candidate will be treated as contributions to the candidate. BCRA § 214(a) extends that rule to expenditures coordinated with political parties; and §§ 214 (b) and (c) direct the FEC to promulgate new regulations that do not "require agreement or formal collaboration to establish coordination," 2 U. S. C. § 441a(a) note. FECA § 315(a)(7) (B)(ii) is not overbroad simply because it permits a finding of coordination in the absence of a pre-existing agreement. Congress has always treated expenditures made after a wink or nod as coordinated. Nor does the absence of an agreement requirement render § 315(a)(7)(B)(ii) unconstitutionally vague. An agreement has never been required under § 315(a)(7)(B)(i), which uses precisely the same language as the new provision to address coordination with candidates, and which has survived without constitutional challenge for almost three decades. Plaintiffs have provided no evidence that the definition has chilled political speech, and have made no attempt to explain how an agreement requirement would prevent the FEC from engaging in what they fear will be intrusive and politically motivated investigations. Finally, in this facial challenge to BCRA, plaintiffs' challenge to §§ 214(b) and (c) is not ripe to the extent that they allege constitutional infirmities in the FEC's new regulations rather than the statute. Pp. 219-224.
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