Cite as: 540 U. S. 93 (2003)
Syllabus
a constitutionally mandated line between express advocacy and so-called issue advocacy, and that speakers have an inviolable First Amendment right to engage in the latter category of speech. However, a plain reading of Buckley and Federal Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U. S. 238 (MCFL), shows that the express advocacy restriction is a product of statutory interpretation, not a constitutional command. Both the concept of express advocacy and the class of magic words were born of an effort to avoid constitutional problems of vagueness and overbreadth in the statute before the Buckley Court. Consistent with the principle that a constitutional rule should never be formulated more broadly than required by the facts to which it is to be applied, Buckley and MCFL were specific to the statutory language before the Court and in no way drew a constitutional boundary that forever fixed the permissible scope of provisions regulating campaign-related speech. The notion that the First Amendment erects a rigid barrier between express and issue advocacy also cannot be squared with this Court's longstanding recognition that the presence or absence of magic words cannot meaningfully distinguish electioneering speech from a true issue ad. Buckley's express advocacy line has not aided the legislative effort to combat real or apparent corruption, and Congress enacted BCRA to correct the flaws it found. Finally, because the components of new FECA § 304(f)(3)'s definition of "electioneering communication" are both easily understood and objectively determinable, the vagueness objection that persuaded the Buckley Court to limit FECA's reach to express advocacy is inapposite here. Pp. 189-194. (b) With regard to plaintiffs' other concerns about the use of the phrase "electioneering communication," the District Court correctly rejected their submission that new FECA § 304 unnecessarily requires disclosure of the names of persons who contributed $1,000 or more to the individual or group paying for the communication, but erred in finding § 304(f)(5) invalid because it mandates disclosure of executory contracts for communications that have not yet aired. Because the important state interests identified in Buckley—providing the electorate with information, deterring actual corruption and avoiding its appearance, and gathering data necessary to enforce more substantive electioneering restrictions—apply in full to BCRA, Buckley amply supports application of FECA § 304's disclosure requirements to the entire range of "electioneering communications." Buckley also forecloses a facial attack on the new § 304 provision that requires disclosure of the names of persons who contribute $1,000 or more to segregated funds or spend more than $10,000 in a calendar year on electioneering communications. Under Buckley's standard of proof, the evidence here did not establish the requisite reasonable probability of harm to any plaintiff group or its mem-
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