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bers resulting from compelled disclosure. However, the rejection of this facial challenge does not foreclose possible future challenges to particular applications of that disclosure requirement.
This Court is also unpersuaded by plaintiffs' challenge to new FECA § 304(f)(5)'s requirement regarding the disclosure of executory contracts. The new provision mandates disclosure only when a person makes disbursements totaling more than $10,000 in any calendar year to pay for electioneering communications. Given the relatively short timeframes in which such communications are made, the interest in assuring that disclosures are made in time to provide relevant information to voters is significant. Yet fixing the deadline for filing disclosure statements based on the date when aggregate disbursements exceed $10,000 would open a significant loophole without the advance disclosure requirement, for political supporters could avoid preelection disclosures about ads slated to run during a campaign's final weeks simply by making a preelection downpayment of less than $10,000, with the balance payable after the election. The record contains little evidence of any harm that might flow from the requirement's enforcement, and the District Court's speculation about such harm cannot outweigh the public interest in ensuring full disclosure before an election actually takes place. Pp. 194-202. 6. The District Court's judgment is affirmed insofar as it held that plaintiffs advanced no basis for finding unconstitutional BCRA § 202, which amends FECA § 315(a)(7)(C) to provide that disbursements for electioneering communications that are coordinated with a candidate or party will be treated as contributions to, and expenditures by, that candidate or party, 2 U. S. C. § 441a(a)(7)(C). That provision clarifies the scope of § 315(a)(7)(B), which provides that expenditures made by any person in cooperation, consultation, or concert with, or at the request or suggestion of a candidate or party constitute contributions. BCRA pre-empts a possible claim that the term "expenditure" in § 315(a)(7)(B) is limited to spending for express advocacy. Because Buckley's narrow interpretation of that term was only a statutory limitation on Congress' power to regulate federal elections, there is no reason why Congress may not treat coordinated disbursements for electioneering communications in the same way it treats other coordinated expenditures. Pp. 202-203. 7. The District Court's judgment is affirmed to the extent that it upheld the constitutionality of new FECA § 316(b)(2), and reversed to the extent that it invalidated any part of that section. BCRA § 203 extends to all "electioneering communications" FECA § 316(b)(2)'s restrictions on the use of corporate and union general treasury funds. 2 U. S. C. § 441b(b)(2). Because those entities may still organize and administer
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