Appeal No. 1998-0847
Application No. 08/483,762
paragraph bridging pages 7-8), the motivation in the prior art
to combine the references does not have to be identical to
that of appellants to establish obviousness. See In re Kemps,
97 F.3d 1427, 1430, 40 USPQ2d 1309, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 1996),
citing In re Dillon, 919 F.2d 688, 693, 16 USPQ2d 1897, 1901
(Fed. Cir. 1990)(in banc). Appellants further argue that
Dillon is not dispositive since here the prima facie case of
obviousness has been overcome by a showing of unexpectedly
superior results (Brief, page 6). This argument is not well
taken since we do not consider the evidence of unobviousness
(i.e., the showing of allegedly unexpected results) until
after a case of prima facie obviousness has been established.
See In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445, 24 USPQ2d 1443, 1444
(Fed. Cir. 1992). Accordingly,
Kemps and Dillon refer to the motivation to combine references
to establish prima facie obviousness and are dispositive on
this point.
Appellants also argue that the specific claimed
7
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