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system, the creation of a large volume capacity, and the
implementation and integration of new systems into a large banking
environment each separately may not be technically difficult. But
together these activities pose serious technical challenges. We
believe SBS was a technically risky venture for the participants,
as the ability to accomplish all three goals and recover the costs
within a reasonable period of time was substantially uncertain.
This is confirmed, in hindsight, by the Tower Group in an American
Banker article in which respondent's expert discussed the reason
why systems such as SBS have failed:
As the size of core application systems has grown,
it has become impossible for teams of mere mortals to
understand and control the almost infinite number of
details. The world won't hold still while every detail
is isolated, structured, and efficiently related to every
other detail. The number of relationships goes up
exponentially with the number of details - and so does
the number of points where an error can occur. The net
result: a high likelihood of failure.
Teixeira, "Why Big Bank Core-Processing Systems Will No Longer Be
Built", Am. Banker (hereinafter Am. Banker article) 7A (Apr. 11,
1994).
Finally, the SBS customer module built for GMAC could not have
entirely helped in the development of the modules for Norwest and
Bank One because the module for GMAC was not operational until
1990--whereas the rollout for Norwest began in 1989. Further,
systems such as Anacomp, which was acquired by EDS, and others
developed by EDS' competitors, did not offer the functionality or
volume capacity that was critical to SBS' potential success. Thus,
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